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John S. Baker, Jr. *
DANGEROUS WEAPON
State v. McMorris' presented the recurrent problem of the "danger-
ous weapon" 2 which is not what it appears to be. While the court's
majority opinion seems simply to be an unremarkable application of
previous jurisprudence on this point, Justice Dixon raises an objection in
his concurring opinion which gives cause to reconsider the judicial gloss
on the term "dangerous weapon."
3
State v. Levi' held that "a person who commits a robbery by pointing
an unloaded and unworkable pistol at the victim can be adjudged guilty of
armed robbery." 5 More particularly, the court stated that "to be clas-
sified as a dangerous weapon . . . a pistol need not be capable of firing or
inherently dangerous." 6 The court relied heavily upon State v. Johnston,7
which had held that an assault with an unloaded revolver constituted an
assault with a dangerous weapon. Following Levi, State v. Leak8 deter-
mined that "use of an extension to a ratchet coupled with a socket to
convincingly simulate a firearm . . . constituted robbery with a danger-
ous weapon. "9 In State v. Elam," while finding "some evidence" that
the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon, the court specifically
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 343 So. 2d 1011 (La. 1977).
2. LA. R.S. 14:2(3) (1950) provides:
(3) "Dangerous weapon" includes any gas, liquid or other substance or instru-
mentality, which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely to produce death
or great bodily harm.
3. The issue has previously been considered in The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Criminal Law, 36 LA. L. REV. 502, 508
(1976); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971 Term-
Criminal Law, 32 LA. L. REV. 298 (1972); Note, 32 LA. L. REV. 158 (1971).
4. 259 La. 591, 250 So. 2d 751 (1971).
5. Id. at 598-99, 250 So. 2d at 754.
6. Id.
7. 207 La. 161, 20 So. 2d 741 (1944).
8. 306 So. 2d 737 (La. 1975).
9. Id. at 739.
10. 312 So. 2d 318 (La. 1975).
[Vol. 38
WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1976-1977
declined to extend Levi or to hold that a "hand in a pocket" is a dangerous
weapon. I 1
In McMorris an undercover narcotics transaction evolved into an
attempted robbery when the defendant pointed an undisclosed object and
announced, "This is a rip-off, give me all your money.or I'm going to
blow you away." What had appeared to have been a pistol under the
defendant's shirt proved, after frustration of the robbery, only to be a half-
pint liquor bottle. In upholding the conviction as an attempted armed
robbery, the court found relevant to the issue of "dangerous weapon"
"the [state] witness' testimony that a bottle might be used to strike as well
as to deceive ... ,'12 The court cited language from Levi that "the
continuous threat and capability . that it will be used as a bludgeon" 3
is a factor in determining what is a "dangerous weapon."
In his concurring opinion, Justice Dixon objected that the record
contained no evidence "that the bottle in this case was calculated or likely
to produce great bodily harm."" He indicated the need to demonstrate
that the bottle posed an actual or threatened, as opposed to a possible,
danger. 15
The bottle was kept in the defendant's pocket, presumably to give the
appearance that he was concealing a gun, but no evidence was
11. Id. at 322.
12. 343 So. 2d at 1016.
13. 343 So. 2d at 1016, citing State v. Levi, 259 La. 591,593,250 So. 2d 751,754
(1971).
14. 343 So. 2d at 1019.
15. The evidence in the record did not indicate any attempted or threatened use
of the bottle as a bludgeon.
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Detective Speir whether he
considered a bottle a dangerous weapon. Speir responded, "Not whenever I
can see it, no sir I don't, but whenever I can't, I don't know." On redirect
examination, the State inquired of Speir why he did not consider a bottle a
dangerous weapon. Defense counsel's objection to the question was overruled
and Speir repeated his testimony that had he known defendant's weapon was a
bottle, he would not have been frightened by it. Defense counsel objected on
the grounds of relevancy when Speir went on to testify under what circum-
stances even a visible bottle might be dangerous, for instance, if it were used
as a club.
Once the defense had requested Speir's opinion as to the dangerousness of
a bottle, the State was authorized on redirect examination to pursue this line of
inquiry. Further, the witness' testimony that a bottle might be used to strike as
well as to deceive was relevant to the jury's consideration of the dangerous
nature of the weapon.
343 So. 2d at 1016 (emphasis added).
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offered to show that the bottle was used or intended to be used to do
anything else but create that illusion.16
Justice Dixon apparently did not consider as relevant the danger created by
the illusion of a weapon. Furthermore, he equated a "bottle in the pocket"
with a "hand in the pocket" and, on the basis of State v. Elam, he
concluded that neither constitutes a '.'dangerous weapon." 17
The writer suggests that Justice Dixon's position conflicts with Levi
and miscontrues Elam. Quoting State v. Johnston, Levi emphasizes
primarily the effect on the victim created by the illusion of a weapon.
Under the definition of article 2 a dangerous weapon is not
necessarily an instrumentality that can or will, without some inter-
vening circumstance, produce death or great bodily harm; neither,
thereunder, is it only one which in itself is likely to produce the stated
result. Rather, the codal provision contemplates and specifically
provides for "any * * * instrumentality, which in the manner used, is
calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm."
Usually in a situation of that kind the person so assaulted
attempts to escape, to wrest the gun from the assailant, or to deliver
to him some death dealing blow; and, in making any of these
attempts, serious injury often results. Moreover, under the circum-
stances that existed here, as the trial judge correctly points out, "the
complainants, in order to repel their assailant, would have been
justified if they had either inflicted great bodily harm upon him or
slain him, because it was reasonable for them to believe that their
lives were placed in danger by the conduct of the defendant"."8
Although State v. Elam declined to extend Levi to a "hand in the
pocket," the opinion does not discuss the reasons for failing to do so."1
The reason for not extending Levi to the hand in the pocket, it is
submitted, has nothing to do with the illusion created; a hand in the pocket
can create the very danger adverted to in Levi and Johnston just as
effectively as any other illusionary weapon. Rather, a hand in the pocket is
16. 343 So. 2d at 1019.
17. Id.
18. 259 La. 591, 596, 250 So. 2d 751, 753 (1971), quoting from State v. John-
ston, 207 La. 161, 167, 20 So. 2d 741, 743-44 (1944).
19. The court disposed of the issue by finding "some evidence" that the
defendant had been armed with a dangerous weapon although none was recovered
when he was arrested shortly after the robbery.
[Vol. 38
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distinguishable from other simulated weapons only because, as State v.
Calvin20 states, a hand is not an "inanimate instrumentality" 2 as contem-
plated by the definition of dangerous weapon. In other words, the Levi
principle would apply equally well to the hand in the pocket, if a hand
were an "instrumentality." Given that a bottle is an "instrumentality,"
"a bottle in the pocket" is indistinguishable from an unworkable gun or a
ratchet extension, while quite distinguishable from a hand in the pocket for
purposes of defining a "dangerous weapon."
Nevertheless, the importance of Justice Dixon's view is that it illumi-
nates the possible distortion of the Levi rationale stemming from the
McMorris majority's brief treatment of the issue. The primary rationale of
Levi, quoted above, stresses that pointing an unloaded gun creates actual
danger because "in the manner used, [it] is calculated or likely to produce
death or great bodily harm.'"22 The McMorris majority, however, quotes
other language from Levi focusing upon the possible danger, namely "the
continuous threat and capability . . . that it will be used as a bludgeon."
23
Given this latter language, Justice Dixon is quite justified insofar as he
asks to see evidence either of the threat or the capability of using this bottle
as a bludgeon. As pointed out in an earlier review of Levi, the possible use
as a bludgeon is a "rationale [that] cannot be supported under the statutory
standard which requires the court to look at how the weapon actually was
used, not how it may have been used." 24
The Levi language concerning the possible use as a bludgeon is not
essential to the basically sound rationale of Levi. Nevertheless, what
constituted only a collateral consideration in Levi, and grew to
"makeweight" for the court's opinion in Leak, 25 blossoms forth finally in
McMorris as "relevant to the jury's consideration of the dangerous nature
of the weapon." 26 To the contrary, this writer submits that the possible, as
opposed to the intended or threatened, use of an instrument as a bludgeon
is not relevant to the definition of "dangerous weapon."
20. 209 La. 257, 24 So. 2d 467 (1945), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1945-1946 Term-Criminal Law, 7 LA. L. REV. 288 (1947).
21. 209 La. at 266, 24 So. 2d at 469.
22. LA. R.S. 14:2(3) (1950).
23. 343 So. 2d at 1015, quoting State v. Levi, 259 La. 591, 598, 250 So. 2d 751,
754 (1971).
24. Note, 32 LA. L. REV. 158, 163 (1971).
25. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-
Criminal Law, 36 LA. L. REV. 502, 509 (1976).
26. 343 So. 2d at 1016.
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ACCESSORY AFrER THE FACT
Both State v. Mitchell27 and State v. Jackson28 involve the crime of
accessory after the fact.29 Beyond that, however, the cases are very
dissimilar, particularly in that they contradict one another on the require-
ment of intent.
In State v. Mitchell the defendant, accompanied by another woman,
snatched the purse of a third woman. Rather than trying the defendant for
simple robbery, the district attorney charged her in an amended bill of
information with being an accessory after the fact to the simple robbery.
The defendant contended that she could not be both a principal and an
accessory after the fact to the same crime. Rejecting this argument, the
court reasoned that, while being a principal, she could also act as an
accessory after the fact by aiding the co-principal. Then, interpreting
article 2530 to require only general criminal intent, the court found evi-
dence of such intent to aid the co-principal as follows:
Although Martha Mitchell's primary motive may well have been to
save herself from apprehension and prosecution, she must have
adverted to the fact that she was also aiding another principal, Diane
Butler, to "escape from arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment." 31
The court's opinion errs in two respects. First of all, that a person can
be both a principal and accessory after the fact to the same crime
contravenes the traditional understanding of an accessory after the fact,
which was intended to be codified in article 25. As the Reporter's
Comment states, the article "corresponds to the common law and usual
statutory definition of accessories after the fact, except in one particu-
lar." 32 Among the commonly understood requirements for the crime of
27. 337 So. 2d 1189 (La. 1976).
28. 344 So. 2d 961 (La. 1977).
29. LA. R.S. 14:25 (1950).
30. LA. R.S. 14:25 provides in pertinent part: "An accessory after the fact is
any person who, after the commission of a felony, shall harbor, conceal, or aid the
offender, knowing or having reasonable ground to believe that he has committed
the felony, and with the intent that he may avoid or escape from arrest, trial,
conviction, or punishment."
31. 337 So. 2d at 1190.
32. The one exception, not here applicable, is that "[w]hile the common law
rule required actual knowledge that the person aided had committed a felony, the
definition adopted makes it sufficient that the accessory after the fact knew or had
'reasonable ground to believe' that the one assisted had committed a felony." LA.
R.S. 14:25 (1950) (Reporter's Comment).
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accessory after the fact is that the defendant not be a principal to the
crime."
Moreover, the court's rationale hardly offers a convincing case for
departing from the traditional requirement. The court finds it "immaterial
that Ms. Augusta's purse was actually snatched by [defendant] Martha
Mitchell . . . .[because] there were two principals to the robbery, Diane
Butler and Martha Mitchell." '34 Significance is seen in the fact that the
defendant is charged as an accessory after the fact to the crime of Ms.
Butler and not to her own crime.35 The implication is that the defendant
could not have been convicted as an accessory after the fact to her own
crime. Such a distinction, however, slights the fact that Ms. Butler
became a principal only because she intentionally aided Ms. Mitchell,
who actually snatched the purse. In aiding Ms. Butler after the fact, she
has aided the person who assisted her during the fact. To affirm her
conviction by making a distinction between aiding a co-principal and
aiding herself suggests simply a result-oriented reasoning. Convinced that
the defendant is guilty of the more serious crime of simple robbery, the
court seems disinclined to reverse her conviction for the less serious
crime. In so doing, however, the court does violence to the distinction
between principal and accessory after the fact intended to be preserved by
the Code. 36
The court commits a second error by characterizing accessory after
the fact as a general intent crime. The court's error rests on the mistaken
premise that
La. R.S. 14:25 does not by its terms require specific criminal intent
to aid the offender in avoiding detection or punishment.37
Article 25, however, specifies that the offender must act "with the intent
that he may avoid or escape from arrest." As thus expressed, the article
requires a qualified and, therefore, specific intent.3" Moreover the Repor-
33. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 66, at 523 (1972); R. PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAW 667 (2d ed. 1969).
34. 337 So. 2d at 1190.
35. The opinion noted: "The bill of information as finally amended charged
Martha Mitchell with aiding and abetting Diane Butler, knowingly and with rea-
sonable grounds to believe that Ms. Butler had committed a felony. The State did
not charge Martha Mitchell as an accessory for aiding and abetting herself, after the
commission of the crime." 337 So. 2d at 1190.
36. Compare LA. R.S. 14:24 (1950) (Reporter's Comment) with id. 14:25 (1950).
37. 337 So. 2d at 1190.
38. See State v. Elzie, 343 So. 2d 712, 713-14 (La. 1977), where the court stated:
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ter's Comment indicates the importance of article 25's intent require-
ment. 39 Finally, the later case of State v. Jackson,' without referring to
Mitchell, simply declares that article 25 "requires evidence that the
defendant harbored, concealed, or aided the felon personally with the
specific intent of preventing his apprehension and punishment." 4'
In a well-considered opinion by Justice Sanders, State v. Jackson
reversed the conviction for accessory after the fact to a burglary where the
defendant, knowing of a burglary, had asked for and received from the
burglars a part of the stolen merchandise in return for an agreement not to
report them to the police. The opinion carefully distinguished the crime of
accessory after the fact from several other crimes: misprision of a felony
(which is not a crime in Louisiana),42 compounding a felony,43 and
receiving stolen things." Noting that the defendant was guilty of both
compounding a felony and receiving stolen things, the court nevertheless
reversed the conviction because "[n]o aid [was] given to the fugitive
personally to prevent his arrest" 45 as required for an accessory after the
fact conviction.
[1]n Louisiana, we require proof of specific intent where the statutory
definition of a crime includes the intent to produce or accomplish some pre-
scribed consequence (the frequent language being "with intent to... "). See
e.g., State v. Lewis, 288 So. 2d 348 (La. 1974) (burglary); State v. Fontenot,
256 La. 12, 235 So. 2d 75 (1970) (obscenity); State v. Daniels, 236 La. 998, 109
So. 2d 896 (1959) (public intimidation), (overruled insofar as a procedural point,
State v. Gatlin, 241 La. 321, 129 So. 2d 4, 7-8 (1961), but not as to its
substantive holding). See also LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law, Section 28
(1972).
(Emphasis added). See also LA. R.S. 14:11 (1950) and Reporter's Comments.
39. The Reporter's Comment states in pertinent part:
While the common law rule required actual knowledge that the person aided
had committed a felony, the definition adopted makes it sufficient that the
accessory after the fact knew or had "reasonable ground to believe" that the
one assisted had committed a felony. Proof of actual knowledge is sometimes
very difficult; and the really innocent accomplice after the fact will be protect-
ed by the concluding requirement that the assistance must be rendered "with
the intent that he may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction, or punish-
ment."
LA. R.S. 14:25 (1950) (Reporter's Comment).
40. 344 So. 2d 961 (La. 1977).
41. Id. at 963 (emphasis added).
42. See LA. R.S. 14:131 (1950) (Reporter's Comment).
43. LA. R.S. 14:131 (1950).
44. Id. 14:69 (1950).
45. 344 So. 2d at 964.
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OBSCENITY
In several cases last term, the supreme court addressed issues posed
by Louisiana's amended obscenity statute. 46 State v. Amato47 upheld the
constitutionality of the legislature's definition of obscenity.48 Finding the
statute neither vague 49 nor overbroad, 5° the court reversed the trial judge's
action of quashing the bill of information. Writing the majority opinion,
Justice Dennis expressed his own doubts about the possibilities of defining
obscenity. 5 Nevertheless, as he recognized, 52 the statute so closely track-
46. LA. R.S. 14:106 (Supp. 1974).
47. 343 So. 2d 698 (La. 1977).
48. The defendant challenged LA. R.S. 14:106(a)(2) (Supp. 1974) which pro-
vides:
A. The crime of obscenity is the intentional:
(2) Participation or engagement in, or management, production, presen-
tation, performance, promotion, exhibition, advertisement, sponsorship or
display of, hard core sexual conduct when the trier of fact determines that the
average person applying contemporary community standards would find that
the conduct, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; and the hard
core sexual conduct, as specifically defined herein, is presented in a patently
offensive way; and the conduct taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value.
Hard core sexual conduct is the public portrayal, for its own sake, and for
ensuing commercial gain of:
(a) Ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual, simulated or
animated, whether between human beings, animals or an animal and a human
being; or
(b) Masturbation, excretory functions or lewd exhibition, actual,
simulated or animated, of the genitals, pubic hair, anus, vulva or female breast
nipples, or
(c) Sadomasochistic abuse, meaning actual, simulated or animated,
flagellation or torture by or upon a person who is nude or clad in undergar-
ments or in a costume which reveals the pubic hair, anus, vulva, genitals or
female breast nipples, or the condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise
physically restrained, on the part of one so clothed; or
(d) Actual, simulated or animated, touching, caressing or fondling of, or
other similar physical contact with a pubic area, anus, female breast nipple,
covered or exposed, whether alone or between humans, animals or a human
and an animal, of the same or opposite sex, in an act of apparent sexual
stimulation or gratification; or
(e) Actual, simulated or animated stimulation of a human genital organ
by any device whether or not the device is designed, manufactured and mar-
keted for such purpose.
49. 343 So. 2d at 702-03.
50. Id. at 703.
51. Justice Dennis noted the following:
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ed the language previously approved by the United States Supreme Court
in Miller v. California5 3 and its progeny54 that the court's decision could
not have been otherwise in terms of federal constitutional law. Even
Justice Dixon, the lone dissenter, protested only that the statute violated
principles of Louisiana law, "the United States Supreme Court to the
contrary notwithstanding."s
In 1973 the state supreme court, responding to Miller v. California,
declared unconstitutional Louisiana's then-current definition of obsceni-
ty.56 As a result of that ruling, in 1974 the legislature re-enacted the
obscenity statute along the guidelines established by Miller.17 Among
other changes in the statute, the legislature made a significant change in
the immunity from arrest and prosecution granted to those theater and
bookstore employees who have neither "managerial duties" nor any
"financial interest" in the operations. Under the previous version of the
obscenity statute, this immunity had been unqualified. In the 1974 act, the
legislature limited the immunity by making it inapplicable when
there is no person having managerial duties or a financial interest in
the possession, exhibition or sale of obscure58 [sic] materials subject
Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall
joined, dissenting in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S. Ct.
2628, 37 L.Ed. 2d 446 (1973), stated: "Although we have assumed that obsceni-
ty does exist and that we know it when [we] see it, Jacobellis v. Ohio, [378 U.
S. 184] at 197 [84 S. Ct. 1676], 12 L. Ed. 2d 793 (Stewart, J. concurring), we are
manifestly unable to describe it in advance except by reference to concepts so
elusive that they fail to distinguish clearly between protected and unprotected
speech." 413 U.S. at 84, 93 S. Ct. at 2648, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 473.
Despite the ring of truth in Justice Brennan's words ....
343 So. 2d at 701.
52. 343 So. 2d at 701.
53. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
54. Post-Miller cases cited by the court were Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153
(1974); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
55. 343 So. 2d at 705.
56. State v. Shreveport News, Inc., 287 So. 2d 464 (La. 1973).
57. See Highlights of the 1974 Regular Session-Obscenity Regulation, 35 LA.
L. REV. 601, 603 (1975).
58. In State v. Johnson, 343 So. 2d 705, 707 (La. 1977), discussed in text at
notes 60-80, infra, the supreme court noted the trial court's finding "that the
presence of the word 'obscure' in this paragraph of the statute rendered the entire
obscenity statute unconstitutionally vague, because a person of average intelli-
gence, untrained in the law, could not, on reading the statute, determine the
applicability of paragraph C, and thus could not ascertain whether contemplated
conduct might subject him to criminal prosecution." 343 So. 2d at 707.
The supreme court, however, reserved judgment on this issue. Id.
[Vol. 38
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to immediate arrest and prosecution .59
In State v. Johnson,6° a companion case to State v. Amato, the
supreme court declared that this qualifying clause to the immunity provi-
sion was unconstitutional, but severable from the rest of the statute.
Johnson left the employee immunity intact, making it applicable again in
all circumstances. Curiously, the court rested its holding on the equal
protection clause.
[U]nder any saving construction of the words "subject to immediate
arrest and prosecution," some clerical bookstore and theatre employ-
ees would be subjected to criminal proceedings whereas others would
not, depending on whether their superiors are subject to immediate
arrest and prosecution. Thus the law does not afford all such employ-
ees equal treatment and raises a question as to whether the distinction
between the two classes of clerical employees has been drawn upon a
reasonable basis. We do not think that it has. To make a person's
exposure to a possible fine of $2,000 and possible imprisonment at
hard labor for five years completely dependent upon whether another
person is subject to immediate arrest and prosecution seems to us
entirely unfair and unreasonable. Accordingly, we conclude that the
last clause of La. R.S. 14:106(C) is unconstitutional because it
denied equal protection of the law to one class of clerical bookstore
and theatre employees. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1; La. Const. art.
1, §3 (1974).61
While invoking the equal protection clause, the court avoided the
opportunity to find a violation of due process. The defendant had argued
that the provision was "ambiguous" and failed to afford "fair notice of
the circumstances under which a bookstore or theatre employee. . . may
be penalized.' '62 A holding under the due process clause that the provision
was unconstitutionally vague would have allowed the legislature the op-
tion of attempting to clarify the language if it chose to do so. By invoking
the equal protection clause, on the other hand, the court has precluded any
distinction between the two classes regardless of the statute's clarity.
The writer, however, suggests that the court's reliance upon the equal
protection clause is misplaced. The traditional "rational basis" test does
not prohibit the state from treating different classes of persons differently;
59. La. R.S. 14:106(c)(Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
60. 343 So. 2d 705 (La. 1977).
61. Id. at 708.
62. Id. at 707.
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it prohibits only arbitrarily created classifications-those which lack a
basis reasonably related to the objective of the statute.63 In defining the
criminal laws, it has not been uncommon to make exemptions for certain
persons or situations.' 4 As a general rule, "the United States Supreme
Court has been quite permissive in allowing state legislatures to draw
whatever classifications they choose in enacting criminal laws. "65 Attacks
upon such legislative classifications are not likely to succeed because
the person challenging the statute must ordinarily prove an elusive
negative: that no state of facts can be conceived by which the
classification can be said to have some reasonable basis. Such facts
are readily assumed by the Court even in the absence of any evidence
bearing on the reasons behind the legislature's classification. 66
Yet in Johnson the supreme court determined that the challenged
classification denied equal protection of the law without even considering
possible reasons for the distinction. The opinion "conclude[d] [that] the
Legislature would have passed the statute had it been presented with the
last clause of paragraph C removed.' 67 Not once in the opinion, however,
did its writer pause to wonder why the legislature went out of its way to
qualify a previously unqualified immunity. Certainly, the change was not
wholly without reason.
It occurs to this writer that an obvious inference from the modifica-
tion of the immunity is that the unqualified immunity poses problems of
enforcement. One would expect "adult" bookstores and theaters to calcu-
late every conceivable avoidance of the obscenity law in order to continue
in business. Given the unqualified immunity of employees without "man-
agerial duties" or "financial interest," such enterprises are likely to
operate through out-of-state corporations and without employing local
"managers." On the other hand, legitimate businesses which, among
other commodities, stock some "dirty books" or "girlie magazines" are
not likely to manipulate their management strategy around the obscenity
statute. A corner drugstore, for instance, normally has a manager, if not
the owner, on the premises to attend to customers and otherwise supervise.
Thus one having "managerial duties" or a "financial interest" is usually
available for "immediate arrest and prosecution." Without some qualifi-
63. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
64. See W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 19, at 131-32 (1972).
65. Id. at 133.
66. Id.
67. 343 So. 2d at 709.
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cation to the employee immunity provision, the practical result is that the
statute is enforceable against corner drugstores but not against "adult"
bookstores.
That the result of Johnson is to render the statute unenforceable
against the principal purveyors of obscenity was adequately demonstrated
in State v. Terrebonne.68 Decided after Johnson, the case involved an
obviously "adult" bookstore, owned by an out-of-state corporation and
manned by a single employee. The court reversed the obscenity conviction
of the lone employee because "the record . . . offered no evidence that
the defendant either had managerial duties or any financial interest in the
store." 69 That the employee had no financial interest was undisputed. The
court concluded that the defendant had no "managerial duties" presum-
ably because his position was characterized as that of "cashier." The
court seemed to have given no weight to the fact that when asked prior to
his arrest whether he was the manager, "the defendant replied that he was
in charge at the time.' '70 Nor apparently did the fact that he "locked up the
store"'" after being arrested indicate "managerial duties." If being "in
charge," locking up the store, and having responsibility for the cash
receipts did not constitute "managerial duties," then the court has left the
police with no one to arrest in the typical "adult" bookstore.
In rendering a valid criminal law unenforceable, the court has upset
the balance of constitutional interests at stake. In Smith v. California72 the
United States Supreme Court struck down a local obscenity ordinance
because it did not require that the defendant know the obscene nature of
the book. Concurring, Justice Frankfurter cautioned that
the Court does not hold that a bookseller who insulates himself
against knowledge about the offending book is thereby free to main-
tain an emporium of smut.
73
Analogously, the legislature apparently attempted to prevent the purveyor
of obscenity from insulating himself and his establishment from the force
of the law. That the legislature found it necessary to exempt some but not
all conduct of a similar type was justified by the problems of enforcing the
law. 74
68. 344 So. 2d 1010 (La. 1977).
69. Id. at 1012.
70. Id. at 1011.
71. Id.
72. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
73. Id. at 161 (emphasis added).
74. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTr, CRIMINAL LAW, § 19, at 133.
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Given this understanding of the enforcement problem, it is not unfair
to make a person's punishment "completely dependent upon whether
another person is subject to immediate arrest and prosecution." '75 The
employee of the "adult" bookstore or theater has fair notice that he may
be arrested if his employer does not have someone with "managerial
duties" on the premises. Moreover, subsection F76 of the statute affords
employees substantial protection against a fortuitous arrest in the situation
in which the person having "managerial duties" is temporarily absent.
With one exception,"7 subsection F requires that, prior to any arrest or
prosecution, an adversary hearing to determine the materials' obscenity
must be held. If the materials are adjudged obscene, those who continue to
distribute or display them have particularized notice that an arrest may be
imminent.
For the legislature to emphasize enforcement against the more culp-
able violator of the law, namely the distributor of hard core pornography
as opposed to the corner drugstore, was not only fair but quite reasonable.
Implicitly, the court recognized this very principle in Johnson by approv-
ing the unqualified immunity for ordinary employees although the same
immunity did not apply to those employees having "managerial duties."
Presumably, the court assumed such unequal treatment to be reasonable in
terms of relative culpability. Moreover, in approving the definitions of
other crimes such as rape7 8 and prostitution79 which criminalized male but
not female conduct, the court has recognized that unequal treatment is
75. 343 So. 2d at 708.
76. LA. R.S. 14:106(F) (Supp. 1974) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Except for those motion pictures, printed materials and photographic
materials showing actual ultimate sexual acts or simulated or animated ultimate
sexual acts when there is an explicit, close-up depiction of human genital
organs so as to give the appearance of the consummation of ultimate sexual
acts, no person, firm or corporation shall be arrested, charged or indicted for
any violation of a provision of this section until such time as the material
involved has first been the subject of an adversary hearing under the provisions
of this section, wherein such person, firm or corporation is made a defendant
and, after such material is declared by the court to be obscene, such person,
firm or corporation continues to engage in the conduct prohibited by this
section. The sole issue at the hearing shall be whether the material is obscene.
77. Note that the prior adversary hearing is not a prerequisite to arrest or
prosecution if actual or simulated ultimate sex acts are depicted.
78. State v. Fletcher, 341 So. 2d 340 (La. 1977).
79. State v. Devall, 302 So. 2d 909 (La. 1974), discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Louisiana Constitutional
Law, 36 LA. L. REv. 533, 535 (1976).
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justified because the conduct of only a certain class of persons presents a
particular "social problem."
Johnson's uncritical reliance on the equal protection clause results
effectively in the obscenity statute's unenforceability against the primary
targets of the legislation, distributors of hard core pornography. Justice
Dennis is wrong in stating,
Clearly the main purpose of the obscenity statute will not be defeated
by the invalidity of the last clause of paragraph C.10
The court's error seems explainable either as merely an honest mistake
which ought to be corrected or as an indirect attempt to undermine
enforcement of a statute which the court found to be constitutional in State
v. Amato. The writer urges the court to correct the error by reversing State
v. Johnson at the next opportunity to do so.
80. 343 So. 2d at 709.
